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A Whale of a Tale: The Supreme Court Sets a New Trend Favoring
National Security over Environmental Concerns
Winter v. NRDC'
I. INTRODUCTION
Valuing one group's interests over another is a fundamental
decision that must be made in almost every case heard by a member of the
judiciary. When formulating a decision, a judge must consider all
interests, including the public at large. However, a judge must do so
within the framework of the judicial system while also taking care to
observe the history and past decisions of American courts. In Winter v.
NRDC, environmental advocates argued that the value of protecting
marine mammals was of the utmost importance and that the Navy should
have considered the harmful biological effects that sonar training can have
on animals, such as dolphins and beaked whales.2 The Navy argued that
even though marine mammals could potentially be injured by the use of
sonar during submarine training exercises, a prepared military is required
to meet the United States' ongoing need for protection from foreign
threats.3 This note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Winter v.
NRDC and how the Court reconciled the different interests of
environmental advocates and the armed forces.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Natural Resources Defense Council (hereinafter "NRDC"), the
Plaintiff, argued that the Navy's use of mid-frequency active (hereinafter
"MFA") sonar during anti-submarine warfare practice exercises in the
Southern California (hereinafter "SOCAL") operating area is harmful to
the thirty-seven species of marine mammals that share the SOCAL waters
with the Navy.4 The NRDC contended that MFA sonar can harm marine
' 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
2 Id. at 371.
3 Id. at 370-71.
4 Id. at 371.
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life by causing "permanent hearing loss, decompression sickness, and
major behavioral disruptions," including mass-strandings of marine
mammals.5 The NRDC partially based its claim on the failure of the Navy
to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS") as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter
"NEPA").' The NRDC argued that the harm caused to marine mammals
in the waters of SOCAL far outweigh the Navy's use of MFA sonar.7
The Navy, the Defendant, contended that anti-submarine warfare is
the "Pacific Fleet's top war-fighting priority," and that the SOCAL waters
are an ideal location to conduct integrated training exercises for anti-
submarine warfare.8 Although the actions of the Navy could potentially
violate the Marine Mammal Protection Act (hereinafter "MMPA"), the
Secretary of Defense may exempt the armed forces from compliance with
the MMPA if their activity "is necessary for national defense." Under the
MMPA, the Secretary of Defense may exempt from compliance with the
MMPA any actions by the armed forces that are "necessary for national
defense."10 The Navy argued that the use of MFA sonar during practice
exercises is necessary for the Navy so that its sonar operators are fully
trained and prepared for antisubmarine warfare." The Navy also
contended that there has not been a "documented sonar-related injury to a
marine mammal" in its 40 years of MFA sonar use.12
'Id. Studies have shown that mass-strandings occur when a marine mammal becomes
disoriented due to damage to their auditory systems, which in turn causes the marine
mammal to surface too quickly. See MICHAEL JASNY ET AL., SOUNDS THE DEPTHS 11:
THE RISING TOLL OF SONAR, SHIPPING AND INDUSTRIAL OCEAN NOISE ON MARINE LIFE 7
tbl. 1.2 (2005), available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sound/sound.pdf. The
fast surfacing has been shown to cause decompression sickness, resulting in internal
bleeding within the animal's brain. Id. at 7, 10. It has also been shown that beaked
whales are particularly susceptible to these injuries, id at 6, a main concern in the NRDC
brief.
6 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372-73.
7 Id at 371.
8 1d at 370-71.
Id. at 371. The MMPA prohibits any attempts to harass or kill any marine mammal. 16
U.S.C. §§ 1362(13), 1372(a) (2006).
'0 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f)(1).
" Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 370-71.
12Id. at 366.
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The National Environmental Policy Act requires a federal agency
to prepare an EIS if agency action will affect the "human environment."' 3
Prior to the extensive preparation of an EIS, an agency may prepare a
shorter environmental assessment (hereinafter "EA").14 If an agency finds
the action to have no significant im act on the environment, the agency is
not required to prepare an ElS.' In January 2007, the Secretary of
Defense exempted the Navy's activities in the SOCAL waters from
compliance with the MMPA, but required that the Navy undertake
mitigating procedures to protect the environmental effects that MFA sonar
may have on marine mammal species.16 A month later, the Navy released
an EA finding that the full preparation of an EIS was unneeded because
the submarine training exercises would have minimal impact on the
environment, according to findings within the EA.17
Following the issuance of the exemption from the MMPA and the
subsequent EA, the NRDC filed suit in the District Court for the Central
District of California, arguing that the Navy violated the NEPA, the
Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESA"), and the Coastal Zone
Management Act (hereinafter "CZMA") when the Navy employed MFA
sonar in the waters of SOCAL.' 8 The NRDC argued that an EIS should
1 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
14 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2008).
1 id.
1 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371-72; Required mitigating procedures included "(1) training
lookouts and officers to watch for marine mammals; (2) requiring at least five lookouts
with binoculars on each vessel to watch for anomalies on the water surface (including
marine mammals); (3) requiring aircraft and sonar operators to report detected marine
mammals in the vicinity of the training exercises; (4) requiring reduction of active sonar
transmission levels by 6 dB if a marine mammal is detected within 1,000 yards of the
bow of the vessel, or by 10 dB if detected within 500 yards; (5) requiring complete
shutdown of active sonar transmission if a marine mammal is detected within 200 yards
of the vessel; (6) requiring active sonar to be operated at the 'lowest practicable level';
and (7) adopting coordination and reporting procedures." Id.
1 7 d. The Navy did acknowledge that there would be a low level of harm caused to
marine mammals, including a prediction of eight physical injuries to dolphins per year.
Id. The Navy also predicted 274 possible injuries to beaked whales per year. Id. The
Navy contended that most of these injuries could be avoided if the Navy complied with
the mitigations standards set forth in the Secretary of Defense's exemption order. Id.
18 Id. at 372; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1)(A), 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006).
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have been completed prior to the commencement of the submarine
training exercises because the sonar has been shown to have the capability
of harming marine mammal species.19 The district court granted the
NRDC a preliminary injunction, which prohibited the Navy's use of MFA
sonar in the SOCAL area.20 The district court based its decisions on two
Acts cited by the Plaintiffs, the NEPA and the CZMA.2 1 The court
reasoned that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because the NRDC
had "demonstrated a probability of success on their claims" and without
an injunction, there existed a "possibility of irreparable harm to the
environment."22 The Navy appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed
the preliminary injunction, but remanded to the district court to narrow its
broad preliminary injunction to allow for the continued use of the SOCAL
area for sonar exercises. The new injunction placed additional mitigating
conditions on the Navy designed to further protect marine mammals
susceptible to harm from the Navy's MFA sonar.23 The narrowly tailored
injunction allowed for the exercises in the SOCAL area to continue if the
new conditions could be met and followed by naval personnel.24
The Navy accepted the injunction in part, but rejected and
appealed two of the additional mitigating conditions present in the new
injunction.25 The Navy first challenged a condition that required the
complete power down of MFA sonar when a marine mammal was spotted
within 2,200 yards of a ship, which was increased from the current
19 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372.
20 d
21 id.
2 2 Id. at 372-73 (quoting NRDC v. Winter, No. 8:07-cv-00335-FMC-FMx, 2007 WL
2481037, at *7, *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007)).23 Id. at 373.24 Id. On remand, the six conditions imposed by the District Court were: "(1) imposing a
12-mile 'exclusion zone' from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to conduct additional
monitoring for marine mammals; (3) restricting the use of 'helicopter-dipping' sonar; (4)
limiting the use of MFA sonar in geographic 'choke points'; (5) shutting down MFA
sonar when a marine mammal is spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6) powering
down MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface ducting conditions, in which sound
travels further than it otherwise would due to temperature differences in adjacent layers
of water. Id.25 d
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accepted radius of 200 yards.26 The second challenged condition added
by the district court was that the Navy would power down MFA sonar by
6 decibels during significant surface ducting conditions. 27
The Navy appealed the ruling of the district court to the President
of the United States and the Council on Environmental Quality
(hereinafter "CEQ") because the executive branch, at its discretion, may
exempt an agency from compliance with the two separate controlling Acts
that the district court had relied upon. 28 The part of the ruling based on
the CZMA was appealed to the President of the United States. 29 The
President stated that the naval activities in SOCAL were "essential to
national security" and granted the Navy an exemption from the CZMA,
citing a section that allows the President to grant an exemption if the
activity is "in the paramount interest of the United States." 30 The Navy
simultaneously appealed the part of the ruling based on the NEPA to the
CEQ. 3 1 The CEQ may exempt an individual government agency from
compliance with the NEPA in "emergency circumstances." 32 The CEQ
exempted the Navy from compliance with the NEPA, stating that the
injunction created a "significant and unreasonable risk" in regards to the
preparedness of the naval strike groups. 33
With the two newly acquired exemptions from the controlling
Acts, the Navy moved for a vacatur of the prior district court and circuit
court decisions. 34 The district court and circuit court refused to vacate its
decisions, basing its refusal on the courts' doubt as to the lawfulness of the
CEQ's determination of "emergency circumstances."35 The circuit court
ruled that there was likely no emergency because the circumstances of the
injunction were predictable.36 The circuit court also stated that the EA,
1 Id. at 373, 378.27 Id. at 373.
28 Id. at 373-74.
29 d
30 Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(B) (2006)).
31 Id.
32 Id. n.3 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2008)).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 374.
35 id
36 Id. (citing NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 681 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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which the CEQ and Presidential decisions were based upon, was "cursory,
unsupported by cited evidence, or unconvincing." 37 The Navy was then
granted a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on a
motion to vacate the lower court's decisions.
The United States Supreme Court issued a narrow ruling in Winter
v. NRDC, refusing to address the merits of the case, but reversing the
lower courts' decisions and remanding. Specifically, the court held that
(1) the granting of a preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion
because the standard for a injunction should be that irreparable harm was
"likely" and not the lower court's standard of "possibility" of irreparable
harm, and (2) the United States' interest in deploying prepared naval
personnel far outweighed the potential environmental impacts on marine
mammals. 38
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. National Environmental Policy Act and Possible Exemptions
In 1969, Congress passed the NEPA which requires all federal
agencies to prepare an EIS when an agency action will significantly affect
the "human environment." 39  The goal of the NEPA is to focus
government and public attention on the environmental effects of a
proposed action and require a government agency to consider mitigating
or alternative procedures that can be undertaken to limit the impact that
the actions will have on the environment. 4 0 Through its interpretation of
the NEPA, the CEQ has provided for the preparation of a preliminary EA
prior to requiring an EIS to determine whether an action will significantly
n Id. (quoting NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d at 693).3 8Id. at 375-76.
3'42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
4 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989); see 42 U.S.C. §
4332(C)(i)-(v). An EIS is to be prepared early in an agency's decision-making process
and prior to any action taken that could adversely affect the environment. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.2 (2008).
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affect the human environment. 4 1  If the EA shows that the agency's
actions will "not have a significant effect on the human environment,"
then there is no need for the preparation of an EIS.42
Courts have recognized three possible exemptions from the NEPA
requirement of preparation of an EIS. The first, as previously addressed, is
the preparation of an EA, which exempts an agency if the agency finds
that its actions will not have a significant impact on the environment. 43
Second, Congress may also pass a statute exempting a specific federal
agency from NEPA requirements, which usually arises when there is a
substantial national interest to not require an agency to fulfill the
requirements of the NEPA.44  The final alternative for an agency that
wishes not to comply with NEPA requirements, even when the agency is
required to prepare an EIS, is to petition the CEQ, stating that compliance
with the NEPA is not possible because of "emergency circumstances." 45
Under the pertinent regulation, the CEQ may arrange for alternate or
limited NEPA requirements to "control the immediate impacts of the
emergency."46 If an agency's action is not needed to be exempted to
control the emergencg, then the agency is still required to comply with
NEPA requirements.
B. The Coastal Zone Management Act and Possible Exemption
The CZMA of 1972 was enacted to encourage states to implement
41 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. An Environmental Assessment is a less burdensome document
that provides a brief overview of the environmental impact of the actions. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9.
42 40 C.F.R. §1508.13.
43 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
4 See, e.g., Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 317, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-57 (2000) (exempting military from
preparing an EIS for low-level flight training because of the necessity to national
security).
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voluntary state management programs for its coastal areas.48 If a state has
implemented a coastal zone management program, a federal agency must
comply with that state's program to the fullest extent possible if the
agency's actions could affect natural resources within that state.49
Congress has created a procedure for attaining an exemption to the CZMA
if a federal agency will not or cannot comply with a state management
program. Pursuant to Congressional statute, after a decision by a federal
court, the President of the United States may exempt an agency from
complying with a state management program if the agency's activity is in
the "paramount interest of the United States." 5'
C. Standard for Preliminary Injunction
When deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a court
must consider four distinct but related factors before making its final
judgment. The four factors are whether: (1) the plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits of the case; (2) the plaintiff is likely to suffer
irreparable harm; (3) when considering the interests of both parties, the
interests of the plaintiff are more important than defendant's interests; and
(4) a preliminary injunction is in the interest of the general public.5 2 The
Supreme Court has described a district court's analysis on whether to issue
a preliminary injunction as flexible and discretionary.53  In deciding
whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate in cases where the lack of
an injunction may result in irreparable harm to the environment, the Court
has stated that if the injury is sufficiently likely, the balance of harms will
usually favor the issuance of an injunction.54
48 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (2006). A state management program protects and addresses the
natural resources of the coasts of the United States by encouraging a state to consider all
impacts of economic development upon the ecological resources within that state. Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A).
'0 See id. § 1456(c)(1)(B).
5 Id.
52 See infra Legal Background, Part III.A-D.
s3 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321
U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
54 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
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1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first factor to be considered by a court in deciding a
preliminary injunction is whether the party will likely succeed on the
merits.' In Munaf v. Geren, the movants were seeking a preliminary
injunction to prevent their transfer from United States' custody to Iraqi
custody because of crimes committed in Iraq.56 The district court and
circuit court granted the preliminary injunction, basing its decision on
whether the issue of jurisdiction was substantial and ignoring the merits of
the case. 57 The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and
held that a district court abuses its discretion if it grants a preliminary
injunction without determining first whether the movants have a
likelihood of success on the merits.
2. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
The second factor to be considered is whether a plaintiff is likely to
suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted. 59 The
Supreme Court has held that a required factor to be considered by a court
when deciding whether to grant a claim for equitable relief is whether
there is a "likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury." 60
The Supreme Court has held that equitable relief is not issued as a right,
and granting an injunction is within the Court's discretion once the Court
has weiphed the interests of both parties and the interests of the general
public. In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that in environmental
cases where the lack of an injunction may result in irreparable harm and
s Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2219.
I61d. at 2214.
" Id. at 1219.
58Id
' See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
60 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
43-44 (1971)).
61 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
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injury is sufficiently likely, the balance of harms will usually favor the
issuance of an injunction.
3. Balancing of the Interests of Both Parties
The third factor for determining whether a preliminary injunction
is appropriate is that the interests of the moving party substantially
outweigh the interests of the non-moving party. 63 In Amoco Production
Co. v. Gambell, Alaskan native villages sought an injunction against the
Secretary of Interior to prevent the selling of oil and gas leases in Alaska
before using the required statutory procedures for use of Native lands. 64
The Supreme Court held that a district court "must balance the competing
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting
or withholding of the requested [equitable] relief."65 The Court stated that
the injury to the moving party in Amoco would be minimal because the
Secretary of Interior's actions would likely not result in the pollution of
the waters in Alaska that the statute was designed to protect.6 The Court
held that even when there is likelihood of irreparable harm, the interests of
both parties, as well as the general public's interest, should be balanced to
determine if equitable relief is appropriate, and that it is up to the
discretion of the district court in determining that issue.67
4. Balancing of the Interests of the General Public
The final factor to be considered by a district court when ruling on
whether a preliminary injunction should be granted is how such a grant
will affect the interests of the public at large. In Yakus v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that if a preliminary injunction could possibly
affect the interests of the public, the Court may withhold its ruling on an
62 Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545.
61 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440.
'480 U.S. at 535.
61 Id. at 542.
66Id. at 544-45.
67 Id. at 543.
68 See id. at 542.
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injunction, even if all the other factors have been satisfied, and wait to
grant equitable relief following a decision on the merits of the case. 69 The
Court said that withholding a grant of preliminary injunction in this case is
appropriate even if it places a burden on the moving party.7 0 The Court
held that due consideration must be given to the interests of the public, and
that the interests of the parties involved are not the single interests to be
considered.n
D. Deference to Military Authority's Judgment
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the judiciary is "ill
equipped to determine the impact . . . that any particular intrusion upon
military authority might have" and that great deference should be given by
the courts to the "professional judgment of military authorities."7 2 The
Supreme Court has defined "professional military judgments" as a
"complex, subtle and professional decision as to the composition, training
and equipping, and control of a military force."73 In Goldman v.
Weinberger, the plaintiff, a Jewish man in the Air Force, was seeking
equitable relief because an Air Force regulation prevented him from
wearing a yarmulke while on duty.74 The plaintiff argued that the
regulation was a violation of the First Amendment. 7 5  The Air Force
argued that there was a strong legitimate interest in uniformity of dress
and that allowing an accommodation for the plaintiff would undermine
69 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).70 id
1 Id.
72 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 305 (1983)).
7 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). The Court stated that judgments regarding
the military should be left to branches that are beholden to the electoral process and that
"it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have
less competence." Id.; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276-77 (2008)
(stating that "neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day
with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.").
74 475 U.S. at 504.
75 id.
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76those interests. The Court stated that even when there is a
constitutionally protected right, such as the free exercise clause protected
by the First Amendment, courts "must give great deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative
importance of a particular military interest."77
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by four members of the Supreme
Court, ruled that the district court's preliminary injunction was
inappropriate. Chief Justice Roberts also stated that since the equitable
remedy provided was inappropriate, the Court did not need to decide the
merits of the case of whether the Navy should have been required to
prepare an EIS.79
The first issue the Supreme Court addressed was whether the
district court had applied the incorrect standard for determining a
preliminary injunction.8 0 The Court outlined the four factors that must be
considered for granting a preliminary injunction, which are: "[the plaintiff]
is likely to succeed on the merits; [the plaintiff] is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; that the balance of
equities tips in [the plaintiff s] favor; and that an injunction is in the public
interest."8' The Supreme Court agreed with the Navy's argument that the
lower court erred in applying a standard of "possibility" of suffering
irreparable harm. 82 The Court stated that it has reiterated the standard
many times, explaining that irreparable harm must be deemed to be
"likely." 83  The Court held that issuing an injunction based on the
7 1 d. at 506.
n7Id. at 507.
78 Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 369-70 (2008).
7 9 Id. at 376.
o Id. at 374-75.
81 Id. (citing Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218-19 (2008)).
82 1d at 375.
83 Id (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983)).
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"possibility" standard is inconsistent with Court precedent, which has
recognized the "extraordinary" nature of the remedy. 4
The Supreme Court also held that the district court erred in not
reconsidering the likelihood of irreparable harm that would result
subsequent to the four new restrictions that the Navy did not challenge.8 5
In a second decision by the district court, after being requested by the
circuit court to narrow the previously decided preliminary injunction, the
district court placed six additional specific requirements to protect the
interests of the Plaintiff.8 6 The Navy accepted four of the new conditions
but challenged the other two in appeal.8 The Supreme Court stated that
the district court failed to review the effects that the new requirements
would have on the interests of the Plaintiff, and that this failure was a
significant error in the district court's final decision prior to this case.
The Supreme Court then weighed the interests of the general
public. The Court used a balancing test to determine the most important
factors of public concern, analyzing both military and environmental
interests, but reiterated the traditional judicial maxim by stating that
equitable relief is an "extraordinary remedy" and must never be awarded
as of right.89 Balancing public interests, the Court found that the case
tipped strongly in favor of national security and that conducting training
exercises under realistic conditions was most important to the public.9 0 In
regards to the other traditional factors used in determining a preliminary
injunction, the Court held that where there are significant military and
environmental interests at odds with one another, it is appropriate for a
court to ignore the traditionally considered factors of whether an action
will likely cause irreparable harm. 91 The Court held that because the
interests of the Navy are of utmost importance to the general public, even
84 Id. at 375-76.
85 Id. at 376; see supra note 24.
86 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373.
7 Id.; see supra note 24.
88 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
89 id.
90 1dat 378.
91 Id.; but cf id. at 378 ("Of course, military interests do not always trump other
considerations, and we have not held that they do.").
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if there was a likelihood of irreparable harm, the preliminary injunction
should not have been granted by the district court.9 2
The Court next balanced the equities of both parties, separate from
the public concern. In weighing the interests of both parties, the Supreme
Court recognized the Plaintiff s interest in protecting the marine mammals
in the SOCAL area, but held that the Navy being forced to deploy an
unprepared anti-submarine force was a more important interest and should
take precedence over the interests of the Plaintiff.93 The Court also cited
the President's statements that the need for training the Navy's troops in
the use of active sonar is "essential to national security." 94
The Supreme Court stated that the district court also erred in not
fully weighing the interests of both parties when the court failed to defer
to naval officers' predictions of the 9 potential burden of an injunction
against the Navy's training exercises. The Court found that the district
court's only discussion of determining public interest was in a single
sentence and that this amounted to a cursory and unsatisfactory analysis.96
The Supreme Court summarized by finding that the district court failed to
perform a sufficient analysis or fully consider the concerns of naval
officers, and, for further support, cited the Ninth Circuit's holding, which
stated "[t]he district court did not give serious consideration to the public
interest factor." 97
The Supreme Court then considered the two challenged
requirements imposed by the district court in its preliminary injunction
and how the requirements would potentially affect public interest and
national security. The Supreme Court held that increasing the shutdown
range of MFA sonar to 2,200 yards would be unduly burdensome on the
Navy and would hinder the ability of the Navy to conduct realistic training
exercises. 99 The Court stated that any burden on these training exercises
92 id.
9 Id. at 377-78.
94 Id. at 378.
95 d
96id.
9 7 Id. (citing NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2007)).
9 Id. at 378-80.
99 Id. at 379.
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would result in leaving Navy "strike groups more vulnerable to enemy
submarines." 00 The lower courts argued that the infrequency of spotting
marine mammals and the fact that the Navy had previously agreed to
power down MFA sonar during exercises, showed that the additional
requirement was not unduly burdensome.' 0' The Navy responded by
stating that the voluntary power downs were at "tactically insignificant
times" in its training exercises. 102 The Navy further contended that if a
power down was required at an important time in the exercise then it
would possibly result in the inability of the Navy to certify personnel for
combat. 0 3  The Court further held that the lower courts should have
deferred in its analysis to the concerns of the naval officers. Even though
there was a low likelihood of having to power down MFA sonar, it could
still result in an undue burden in stopping the Navy from certifying its
anti-submarine crews. 104
The Court also held that the lower courts should have included
naval officers' predictions of the burden of imposing a required reduction
in MFA sonar by six decibels during significant surface ducting
conditions. The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit understated the
burden caused by this additional requirement and that the reduction in
decibels would result in unrealistic conditions.' 06
The Court found that the injury to the Plaintiff was the speculative
harm of a few marine mammals, and that the harm against deploying
unready sailors to protect the nation was a far superior interest. 1u7 The
Court held that when considering a case between substantial military
interests compared with speculative environmental interests, a court does
not have to consider the factor of whether there is a likelihood of
irreparable harm because military interests are ordinarily paramount to the
public interest.10 8 The Court held that in these types of cases, it is likely
00 Id. at 380.




10 Id. at 380.
1o6 id.
'0' Id. at 382.108Id. at 378.
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that entering an injunction would be an abuse of discretion so it vacated
the lower court's additional requirements to the extent that the
requirements had not been accepted by the Navy.109
B. Dissenting Opinion
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Souter, found that the district court was correct in awarding a preliminary
injunction because the remedy allowed for the mitigation of harm until the
Navy could complete an EIS.1 10 The dissent argued that when deciding a
claim for equitable relief, there has always been great discretion and
flexibility given to the lower courts and no strict standard should exist for
specific cases. The dissent also argued that the imposition of a
preliminary injunction met a sliding standard that could be determined by
the lower court, and the NRDC made the required showing to justify an
equitable remedy.112
One of the dissent's criticisms of the majority was that NEPA
requirements exist to compel a federal agency to consider the affects of its
actions upon the environment, and an EIS should be completed by all
agencies so that the agencies make fully informed decisions.11 The
dissent further noted that the purpose of requiring an agency to prepare an
EIS is to allow the agency to apply findings derived during the preparation
of the EIS to its decision making process.114 The dissent contended that
the Navy "thwarted" the purpose of an EIS because the Navy commenced
training exercises prior to the completion of an EIS." 5 The Navy started
training exercises in the SOCAL area based on an EA, which stated that
the exercises would not have a significant environmental impact.1 16 The
dissent stated that if the Navy would have completed an EIS prior to
'" Id. at 382.
'
1 0 Id. at 387.
' Id. at 391-92.
I12 Id. at 392.
113 Id. at 389.
114 d.
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commencing its exercises in SOCAL, the district court may not have had
to introduce additional mitigating circumstances because there would have
been a full consideration of environmental impacts and concerns. 117
In the dissent, the justices also argued that the CEQ determination
of "emergency circumstances" was one-sided, and that the CEQ did not
have the authority to grant an agency an exemption from preparing an
EIS." 8  The dissent stated that the CEQ's exemption from NEPA
requirements did not consider any materials from NRDC, on which the
district court had relied.'1 9 The dissent also stated that even though the
CEQ's regulations are given "substantial deference," the CEQ has never
been empowered to fully eliminate an agency's requirement to prepare an
EIS.120 The dissenting justices argued that because the CEQ does not
have the power to eliminate the requirements under NEPA, the ruling by
the CEQ is without substance or merit.121
The dissent concluded by analyzing the importance of the
Plaintiffs interests and the need to protect those interests from further
harm.122  The dissent argued that the irreparable harm that would be
caused by sonar use in the SOCAL area is very high.12 3 It also stated that
the majority downplayed the findings of the Navy's EA, and sonar usage
would result in harm to a substantial portion of the beaked whales and
dolphins in those areas. 124 The dissent completed its analysis by stating
that when comparing the interests of both parties, and the interests of the
public, along with the history of the litigation, the preliminary injunction
and additional mitigating requirements were not an abuse of discretion by
the district court.125
" Id. at 389-90.
"
8 Id. at 391.
'
19 Id. at 390. The dissent also stated that there was "little independent analysis" made by
the CEQ. Id.
20 Id. at 391 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355
(1989)).
12 1 id.
122 Id. at 392-93.
123 Id. at 392-93.
124 Id. at 392.
12s Id. at 393.
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V. COMMENT
Although decided on a very narrow issue, Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion in Winter v. NRDC sets a clear tone regarding any further legal
conflicts between the interests of environmental advocates and the armed
forces. The ruling may also impact future litigation by allowing the
executive branch to bypass environmental regulations by citing military
and public interests in national security. The majority opinion also states
that courts may disregard the traditional factors of "likelihood of success"
and "irreparable injury" when one of the parties is the military and the
case outcome could affect national security. 26
Through the Court's ruling, it is clear that the executive branch
need only cite pressing national security concerns to avoid congressional
requirements. The Supreme Court narrowly ruled that the district court
abused its discretion in not properly balancing the equitable interests of
the parties.12 7 The Supreme Court avoided the chance to rule on whether
the Navy's disregard for the requirement to prepare an EIS under the
NEPA was appropriate, essentially condoning the Navy's actions when
acting within the interests of national security.
The district court had attempted to address this issue in its second
ruling when it narrowly tailored its injunction to incorporate mitigating
procedures that would protect the interests of the environmentalists and
vindicate the spirit of the NEPA, but also allow the Navy to continue the
SOCAL training exercises. Because the Navy had acted inappropriately
by not completing an EIS prior to commencing the SOCAL training
exercises, the district court was forced to use its judgment in crafting
mitigating requirements until an EIS could be completed.128  This
judgment was appropriate given the circumstances and could have been
avoided had the Navy properly prepared the required EIS and determined
its own mitigating procedures for protecting the marine mammal wildlife
while still conducting the SOCAL training exercises. The purpose of the
NEPA is to require government agencies to conscientiously consider the
environmental impact of the agencies' actions, and the Navy's avoidance
126 Id. at 376.
127 Id. at 376, 378.
128 Id. at 372-73
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and disregard for the preparation of an EIS defeated the spirit of the
NEPA.129 In trying to cure the Navy's violation of the NEPA, the district
court may have reached too far with the two requirements challenged by
the Navy, but the district court evaluated both sides' interests and
appropriately used the flexible discretion that is available in fashioning
equitable remedies.130
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Supreme Court
limited its decision to a very narrow ruling and clearly stated that the
military interests and national security were of paramount importance in
this case and that the district court had failed to fully consider those
interests. 1 3 ' This decision sets a clear policy that favors military interests
over other groups' interests. This will make it exceedingly difficult for
advocates to protect the environment through legal means. The Court
went on to say that the case at bar was not a "close question" but
mentioned that "military interests do not always trump other
considerations."' 32 Although this may be true, the majority opinion makes
it abundantly clear that military interests will be hard to defeat when
seeking equitable relief because of judicial deference to military opinion
and a strong policy set by this Court to favor the military's interests.
The decision in Winter v. NRDC also will likely have far reaching
ramifications for many other protected natural resources that are situated
next to military bases and training grounds. Missouri has two separate,
large military bases that are in close proximity to state and national
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)-(v) (2006); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S.
360, 371 (1989).
130 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
131 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 370. Chief Justice Roberts quotes George Washington as saying
"[t]o be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." Id.
During oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts created a hypothetical to balance the
interests of both parties, where a North Korean diesel electric submarine has gotten near
Pearl Harbor undetected and on the other side the potential harm to a marine mammal.
Oral argument at 48, Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365 (No. 07-1239). Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that this was a clear case in favor of the military and the District Court never
considered this analysis. Id.
132 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 378.
See id.
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parks.134 Whiteman Air Force Base, in particular, is the home of the Air
Force's stealth bomber plane, "the B-2 Spirit" and is directly adjacent to a
state park.' 3 5  Prior to Winter, if the military wanted to avoid the
requirements of the NEPA, it would obtain from Congress a statutory
exemption from NEPA requirements.' 36  This provided congressional
oversight and a determination by a branch of the government which was
prepared to evaluate the importance of national security versus
environmental interests of the United States. After the decision in Winter,
if a military base decides to undergo training actions that affect the natural
resources or endangered species of Missouri, it is free from complying
with environmental statutory requirements without the fear of being forced
to stop by a decision of a federal court. If the military chooses not to
complete an EIS, a district court will likely have its hands tied by the
decision in Winter. In deciding whether to grant equitable relief, a court
will have to give the military interests extreme deference, even if of
irreparable harm is guaranteed to be caused by the military's actions. This
decision will clearly affect environmental advocates trying to protect our
nation's natural resources because an environmental advocate's primary
remedy is injunctive relief due to the nature of the interest being
protected.137
Another potential impact on litigation involving requests for
injunctive relief against the armed forces is Chief Justice Roberts' creation
of a new balancing test for determining whether equitable relief is
appropriate when there is a conflict between environmental and military
interests. The majority states that a court may disregard the traditional
134 One such base, Fort Leonard Wood, is within only a few dozen miles of Mark Twain
National Forest. See Fort Leonard Wood,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/fort-leonard-wood.htm (last accessed Aug.
30, 2009) (stating Fort Leonard Wood is "adjacent to the Mark Twain National Forest").
135 Whiteman Air Force Base -509th Bomb Wing,
http://www.whiteman.af.mil/units/509thbombwing/index.asp (last accessed Aug. 30,
2009); see Knob Noster, MO - Official Website,
http://www.knobnostergov.com/history.html (last accessed Aug. 30, 2009).
136 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137 Damages are usually inappropriate because environmentalists are usually attempting
to prevent or slow the destruction of specific natural resources. Amoco Production Co. v.
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
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factors of "likelihood of success" and of "irreparable injury" when there is
a public and naval interest in "effective, realistic training of its sailors." 38
The Court stated that considering these factors alone is enough to deny
injunctive relief.139 The Supreme Court has stated, in past precedent, that
the four traditional factors should be considered together and not be
applied individually on a case by case basis.14 0 Departing from the normal
standard, the majority opinion has created a new standard for litigation
that involves military interests and national security by only requiring the
balancin of the particular party's interests and the interests of the general
public.14  Not considering all the factors together may possibly affect
future litigation because the degree of the irreparable harm could be
extreme, but that factor does not need to be evaluated by the Court
pursuant to Winter.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the new standard for preliminary injunctions will make it
easier for the military to prevail in these types of cases by citing the
necessity of national security, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
Winter v. NRDC is a great loss for advocates who are trying to protect the
environment from the actions of the United States military. The Supreme
Court's new standard may even potentially foreclose many potential
remedies from being used to vindicate the interests of citizens who are
trying to protect the United States' natural resources and native species for
current use and observation, as well as for future generations. The ruling
also essentially condones the Navy's disregard for the core requirement of
the NEPA, which is the preparation of an EIS. The purpose of the NEPA
was to require an agency to make decisions with full information,
including the environmental impact of the agency's actions. The Court
has essentially allowed an agency to bypass this requirement by citing
"national security" or "emergency" conditions. By allowing the Navy to
avoid the completion of an EIS prior to commencing naval training
138 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
139 d140 See supra Legal Background, Part III.A-D.
141 See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
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exercises that have been conceded by the Navy to be harmful to marine
mammals, the Supreme Court sends a clear message that when deciding
whether injunctive relief should be granted against the military, the Court
should give extreme deference to the position and interests of the armed
forces.
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